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Carter et al v. Stanton, Director, Marion County 
Dept. of Public Welfare et al. 
SD Ind. 
app. from 3-judge dist. ct. (Kerner, Steckler and 
Noland) 
Timely 
Facts: 
(A.) 
Section 406Aof the Social Security Act, 
42 u.s.c. 606(a) provides in part: 
{T}he term 'dependent child means a needy cn~ld • • • who has been deprived of parental 
support or care by reason of the death, 
continued absence from the horne, or physical 
incapacity of a parent • • • • 
Indiana Board of Public Welfare Reg. 2-402(b), 
Burn's Ind. Admin. Rules & Regs. Ann. Sec. 52-1001(2-b 
provides: 
When the continued absence is due to 
desertion or separation, the aba~ce shall 
have been continued for a period of at least 
six(6) months prior to the date of application 
for assistance to dependent children; except 
that under exceptional circumstances of need 
and where it is determined that the absence 
of a parent is actual and bona fide an 
application may be filed and ~child may be 
considered immediately eligible upon a special 
finding of the county department of public 
welfare setting forth the facts and reasons 
for such action. 
Appellants are mothers who cla~m that their 
children were rendered destitute as the result 
of the desertion or separation of the father. 
They assert that they applied to the Marion 
County Dept. of Public Welfare and were denied 
the right to complete application forms for 
AFDC assistance or were denied AFDC assistance 
itself, after being permitted to complete the 
application, on the ground that the desertion 
or separation had occurred within the previous 
six months; that no investigation was commenced 
by appellees to determine any exceptional 
circumstances of need; and that no administrative 
appeals were taken from the adverse rulings on 
their attempts to secure the AFDC assistance. 
Appellants filed a complaint in the USDC 
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. 1983, 
claiming that Indiana Public Welfare Reg. 
2-402(b) was unconstitutional. The three-judge 
dist. ct. was convened and dismissed the complaint 
vf on the grounds that appellants had failed to 
exhaust the available state administrative appeal 
J procedures and on the ground that the complaint presented no substantial federal question. 
Conception• ; 
~ppellanta atsert that the State Reg . 1s 
unconstitutional because there ia no reasonable 
relation beeween the six-month requirement and 
the interest of the State in determining 
qualification for the assistance; there is no 
requirement that the State welfare officials 
conduct an investigation to determine exceptional 
circumstances of need and the officials are 
sranted standard-leas and arbitrary discretion 
to determine who is eligible to apply for the 
assistance within the six-month 'eriod; the 
Indiana authorities would have granted the AFDC 
within the 6-month period 
assistance to appellantsAhad they been willing 
to file for legal separation or divorce, and this 
coercion to terminate the marital status violates 
appellants 1 9th amend. right of privacy and their 
c:onatitutional risht to travel (the requirements 
for divorce would ~ibit their travel to anotber 
acate); and tbe aix-.onth requlr--t conflicta 
with the Social Security Act becauae the lattv 
•contain• no risld valtlll& period to eatabllall 
• 'CGDtmuect ••••••. 
Appellants maintain that the dist. ct. 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.s.c. 1343(3) and(4); 
that the question presentedis substantial; and 
that the action of the dist. ct. in dismissing 
the complaint for failure to exhaust state 
administrative remedies is directly contrary to 
the decision in Damico v, California, 389 u.s. 
416 (1967), 2£, Harlan dissenting (Held that where 
suit was filed under the Civil Rigts Act 
challenging as unconstitutional the California 
welfare law and regulations, relief underfhe 
Civil Rights Act may not be defeated by failure 
to seek relief under available State administrative 
remedy,), 
Motion to Affirm: 
The SG of Indiana argues that the question 
presented is not substantial; that the six-
month waiting requirement is not absolure, that 
it can be bypassed by demonstrating exceptional 
circumstances of need, and that the requirement 
is reasonably necessary in determining 
qualification for AFDC assistance because of 
desertion or separation--that a father who leaves 
the home for a "brief soiree" is not absent in 
any "continued" sense; that the State Reg. 
does nor conflict with the federal statute 
because a "continued absenceu is one which 
lasts more than an instant and the State's 
definition of a continued absence as one for 
six months is not unreasonable and does not 
violate the federal requirement to provide 
assistance "with reasonable promptnesstt to all 
eligible individuals; that appellants should be 
required to exhaust their State administrative 
remedies for otherwise there is no case or 
controversy and Damico should be distinguished 
because that case dealt with the question of the 
constitutionality of a State statute while this 
case deals only with the question of the 
constitutioality of a State regualtion . 
MOtion to Dismiss or Affirm: 
Appellee Stanton argues that a claimant is 
not required to file for separation or divorce 
in order to receive assistance within six months 
after desertion or separation, but that the filing 
ia only one factor considered in determining 
d6, Ia,.. ;,. (l 
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eligibility and need; that absence for six 
months is not a mandatory condition for 
assistance; and that KXXXM administrative 
remedies must be exhausted before seeking ~tra­
ordinary relief which the administrative relief 
might render the judicial determination of 
the issues unnecessary, Chicago Automobile 
Trade Ass'n v, Madden, 328 F. 2d 766 (CA 7 1964). 
Addendum: 
Appellants argue that the decision below 
conflicts with the following cases in ~ich 
it was held that sLmilar three-month periods 
for determining "continued absence" were 
unlawful because they conflicted with the 
requirements of the Social Security Act: 
Pamico v. Califo;nia, 2 Pov. L. Rep. Par.l0,478 
N.D. Cal. 1969), and Doe y, Hursh, 2 Pov. L. Rep. 
Par. 11, 753 (D. Minn. 1970). Appellee Stanton 
asserts that Pamico should be distinguished 
because the Cal, regulation prohibited assistance 
prior to the expiration of the three-month 
period unl••• legal action wa• taken to terminate 

